Monday 1 February 2010

RAUMA


MATRIX GOTH BABE RAUMA:

The Fortieth Spirit is Rauma. She is a Great Countess; and appears at first as a Crow, but after the command of the Exorcist she puts on the shape of a most beautiful woman. Her office is to steal money out of the Kings houses, which is many a Bank by hacking into their computer systems and to transfer it wherever she is commanded, and to destroy cities and the dignities of her Master’s enemies when she totally disrupts their cybernetic computer networks of New-World-Order information grid, as well as to tell of all things, Past, and what is and what will be; and to cause Love between Friends and Foes over the world-wide-web of the Microcosmic and Macrocosmic Internet. She will also inform her Master about the Holographic Universe of the Matrix, which is an Inorganic Organism and that he is existing within a Virtual Simulation of a reality whereupon she will show him how to Quantum shift from one Simulation into another of Virtual Alternate Reality possibility when he desires it so, as well as to tell her Master that the fixation upon Monetary exchanges is now an illusion, just pure information filtered through Banking Computer networks, which can be manipulated at the Quantum level of the Dream via Psychokinesis to thence hack into, for everything is made of Light, hence that of Information; but she will only do as her Master bids and to tell of such things and more about the Multiverse Matrix when she has been fed her master’s ejaculation of Emotively Charged issue, which she will sensuously incite via vivid Erotic Lucid Dreams. She was once of the Order of Thrones. She governs 30 Legions of Spirits likened to her self.

MULTIVERSE MATRIX OF FRACTAL VIRTUAL REALITIES

Rauma will teach one about the nature of the Matrix, one to find covered within the Matrix trilogy of films, which inspired many otherwise non-philosophical minded individuals to ruminate upon the nature of reality being that of a Computer Simulation; however, the Matrix scenario of having human brains being kept in floatation tanks by Inorganic Solid-State-Intelligence Machines just to produce their energy needs is ridiculous; or is it?

Well, what if the Inorganic Solid-State-Intelligence is not only utilising the energy of Humanity but that of all Carbon-Based-Life-Forms everywhere it to be seeded; that is, the energy, which the Inorganic-Solid-State-Intelligence is feeding upon is that of Awareness its self & when it is eventually harvested one has the condition of Death; in other words one is being farmed by another order of intelligence just as one has a farmer farming Cattle.

If one is being farmed within a Simulation of a Farm world where ones Awareness is being harvested at the point of Death then one comes back to live the same life all over again from scratch not remembering that one has lived the same life many times prior since ones Awareness of the fact has been harvested around the wheel of Eternal Recurrence.

The Matrix films, leads one to opening a Pandora’s box beyond mere Science Fiction to find a startling conclusion about the nature of reality within which one exists, and that is, one is living inside of a Computer Simulation. Nick Bostrom Professor at Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy & James Martin 21st Century School calls this the Simulation Argument.

Nick Bostrom’s deep Philosophical insight leads one to a startling revelation, there is a significant probability that one, is in fact, existing within a Computer Simulation; Nick Bostrom is quite literal about this: should the Simulation hypothesis be true, one exists within a virtual reality simulation of a computer built by a probable advanced civilisation. Ones brain is also a mere part of a Simulation. How can one take Nick Bostrom’s hypothesis seriously?

NICK BOSTROM SIMULATION ARGUMENT

"Before getting to the gist of the simulation argument, let us consider some of its preliminaries. One of these is the assumption of “substrate independence”. This is the idea that conscious minds could in principle be implemented not only on carbon-based biological neurons (such as those inside your head) but also on some other computational substrate such as silicon-based processors.

Of course, the computers we have today are not powerful enough to run the computational processes that take place in your brain. Even if they were, we wouldn’t know how to program them to do it. But ultimately, what allows you to have conscious experiences is not the fact that your brain is made of squishy, biological matter but rather that it implements a certain computational architecture. This assumption is quite widely (although not universally) accepted among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind. For the purposes of this article, we shall take it for granted.

Given substrate independence, it is in principle possible to implement a human mind on a sufficiently fast computer. Doing so would require very powerful hardware that we do not yet have. It would also require advanced programming abilities, or sophisticated ways of making a very detailed scan of a human brain that could then be uploaded to the computer. Although we will not be able to do this in the near future, the difficulty appears to be merely technical. There is no known physical law or material constraint that would prevent a sufficiently technologically advanced civilisation from implementing human minds in computers.

Our second preliminary is that we can estimate, at least roughly, how much computing power it would take to implement a human mind along with a virtual reality that would seem completely realistic for it to interact with. Furthermore, we can establish lower bounds on how powerful the computers of an advanced civilisation could be. Technological futurists have already produced designs for physically possible computers that could be built using advanced molecular manufacturing technology. The upshot of such an analysis is that a technologically mature civilisation that has developed at least those technologies that we already know are physically possible, would be able to build computers powerful enough to run an astronomical number of human-like minds, even if only a tiny fraction of their resources was used for that purpose.

If you are such a simulated mind, there might be no direct observational way for you to tell; the virtual reality that you would be living in would look and feel perfectly real. But all that this shows, so far, is that you could never be completely sure that you are not living in a simulation. This result is only moderately interesting. You could still regard the simulation hypothesis as too improbable to be taken seriously.

Now we get to the core of the simulation argument. This does not purport to demonstrate that you are in a simulation. Instead, it shows that we should accept as true at least one of the following three propositions:

(1) The chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small

(2) Almost no technologically mature civilisations are interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours

(3) You are almost certainly in a simulation.

Each of these three propositions may be prima facie implausible; yet, if the simulation argument is correct, at least one is true (it does not tell us which).

While the full simulation argument employs some probability theory and formalism, the gist of it can be understood in intuitive terms. Suppose that proposition (1) is false. Then a significant fraction of all species at our level of development eventually becomes technologically mature. Suppose, further, that (2) is false, too. Then some significant fraction of these species that have become technologically mature will use some portion of their computational resources to run computer simulations of minds like ours. But, as we saw earlier, the number of simulated minds that any such technologically mature civilisation could run is astronomically huge.

Therefore, if both (1) and (2) are false, there will be an astronomically huge number of simulated minds like ours. If we work out the numbers, we find that there would be vastly many more such simulated minds than there would be non-simulated minds running on organic brains. In other words, almost all minds like yours, having the kinds of experiences that you have, would be simulated rather than biological. Therefore, by a very weak principle of indifference, you would have to think that you are probably one of these simulated minds rather than one of the exceptional ones that are running on biological neurons.

So if you think that (1) and (2) are both false, you should accept (3). It is not coherent to reject all three propositions. In reality, we do not have much specific information to tell us which of the three propositions might be true. In this situation, it might be reasonable to distribute our credence roughly evenly between the three possibilities, giving each of them a substantial probability.

Let us consider the options in a little more detail. Possibility (1) is relatively straightforward. For example, maybe there is some highly dangerous technology that every sufficiently advanced civilization develops, and which then destroys them. Let us hope that this is not the case.

Possibility (2) requires that there is a strong convergence among all sufficiently advanced civilisations: almost none of them is interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours, and almost none of them contains any relatively wealthy individuals who are interested in doing that and are free to act on their desires. One can imagine various reasons that may lead some civilisations to forgo running simulations, but for (2) to obtain, virtually all civilisations would have to do that. If this were true, it would constitute an interesting constraint on the future evolution of advanced intelligent life.

The third possibility is the philosophically most intriguing. If (3) is correct, you are almost certainly now living in computer simulation that was created by some advanced civilisation. What kind of empirical implications would this have? How should it change the way you live your life?

Your first reaction might think that if (3) is true, then all bets are off, and that one would go crazy if one seriously thought that one was living in a simulation.

To reason thus would be an error. Even if we were in a simulation, the best way to predict what would happen next in our simulation is still the ordinary methods – extrapolation of past trends, scientific modelling, common sense and so on. To a first approximation, if you thought you were in a simulation, you should get on with your life in much the same way as if you were convinced that you are living a non-simulated life at the bottom level of reality.

The simulation hypothesis, however, may have some subtle effects on rational everyday behaviour. To the extent that you think that you understand the motives of the simulators, you can use that understanding to predict what will happen in the simulated world they created. If you think that there is a chance that the simulator of this world happens to be, say, a true-to-faith descendant of some contemporary Christian fundamentalist, you might conjecture that he or she has set up the simulation in such a way that the simulated beings will be rewarded or punished according to Christian moral criteria. An afterlife would, of course, be a real possibility for a simulated creature (who could either be continued in a different simulation after her death or even be “uploaded” into the simulator’s universe and perhaps be provided with an artificial body there). Your fate in that afterlife could be made to depend on how you behaved in your present simulated incarnation. Other possible reasons for running simulations include the artistic, scientific or recreational. In the absence of grounds for expecting one kind of simulation rather than another, however, we have to fall back on the ordinary empirical methods for getting about in the world.

If we are in a simulation, is it possible that we could know that for certain? If the simulators don’t want us to find out, we probably never will. But if they choose to reveal themselves, they could certainly do so. Maybe a window informing you of the fact would pop up in front of you, or maybe they would “upload” you into their world. Another event that would let us conclude with a very high degree of confidence that we are in a simulation is if we ever reach the point where we are about to switch on our own simulations. If we start running simulations, that would be very strong evidence against (1) and (2). That would leave us with only (3)."

(Nick Bostrom, Professor at Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy & James Martin 21st Century School.)

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